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Abstract 
 
Cause-consequence analysis is one of the best tools available for a comprehensive 
reliability study. The cause-consequence diagram (CCD) method, like fault tree 
analysis, represents the failure logic of the system, but in addition the CCD also 
identifies the complete set of consequences following a given initiating event. While 
there are well-developed commercialized software packages for fault tree evaluation 
and construction, no satisfactory methodology has been published for automated 
cause-consequence chart synthesis. 
 
Hence this paper outlines the development of an algorithm for automated cause-
consequence diagram construction. The algorithm builds on methods developed 
previously for fault tree construction, such as topology diagrams, describing how 
components are linked together in a system, and component decision tables which 
model component behaviour. Using this information rules have been developed which 
enable the construction of the CCD. Once constructed the diagram can be quantified 
to give exact system reliability. To demonstrate the construction the algorithm is 
applied to a simple example. 
 
Introduction 
 
In his study, Nielsen [1] developed the cause-consequence diagram as a graphical tool 
for the analysis and description of relevant accidents in complex process plants. The 
method is based on a combination of standard reliability techniques. The cause 
diagram is the conventional fault tree used to describe all causes of an undesired 
event. The consequence diagram is an event-sequential diagram (decision-tree 
diagram) describing the alternative failure sequences that an abnormal event leads to 
if one or more of the accident preventing/limiting provisions fail [1]. By using a 
combination of the reliability methods, the logical connections between independent 
accident causes and accident consequences can be established [2]. The main symbol 
in a CCD is a decision box which contains a component/subsystem condition. It is an 
identical representation of the YES/NO branches in an event tree. Following the 
YES/NO branches of the decision box the diagram is developed until it terminates in 
consequence boxes. As an example of the method consider a simple lamp circuit 
consisting of battery, switch and lamp. When the switch is closed power is supplied to 
the lamp which then lights. The CCD for the system is shown in figure 1. The first 
decision box condition “Switch contacts close” is considered. If the condition is not 
satisfied then the consequence is that there is no light (NL). If the condition is satisfied 
then the condition “Current reaches lamp and it lights” is considered. Once again if 
this is not satisfied then the consequence is NL, however if it is satisfied the 
consequence is light (L). As all paths have terminated in consequence the diagram is 
complete. The causes of the switch contacts not closing and current not reaching the 
lamp are developed using fault trees as shown by the arrows to the first and second 
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decision boxes respectively shown in figure 1, where SW, BATT and LAMP are the 
basic events switch, battery and lamp failure, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Simple cause-consequence diagram 
 
The CCD method has advantageous features in both its representation of a systems 
failure logic and its subsequent quantification. However traditional cause-
consequence analysis is based on manual construction of the diagram. This requires a 
detailed knowledge of the system, plus experience and practice in understanding the 
failure modes of the components within the system and their effects. The construction 
is time-consuming and expensive, moreover, it can be a source of human errors. A 
faster and error free analysis can be performed if the CCD is automatically generated 
by computer from the system description [2]. Past work on automating reliability 
techniques has concentrated on fault tree analysis. As a result, a variety of methods 
for computerized fault tree synthesis have been developed and published. The most 
successful are based on the diagraph method [3]  and the decision table method [4]. 
The features of these two methods were combined [5] in a new method for automating 
fault tree construction appropriate to modelling two-state and continuously variable 
safety systems.  
 
In this paper previous methods applied to fault tree construction are extended to 
automate the construction of the CCD. 
 
Algorithm for the automated construction and analysis of CCD 
 
In the following sections an algorithm will be described that accepts a description of 
the system under construction and generates a CCD which can be quantified in a 
straightforward manner. 
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The automatic generation is based on the following steps: 
i) Initially information about the system required by the algorithm is given; 
ii) The CCD is then automatically constructed by applying the developed 
algorithm; 
iii) The CCD is reduced to its most efficient form by excluding irrelevant decision 
boxes; 
iv) Fault trees describing the failure of subsystems are constructed by employing 
the decision table method [4, 5]; 
v) The cause-consequence diagram is then used to analyse the system considered. 
 
i) Algorithm requirements 
 
In order for the construction algorithm to be implemented detailed information about 
the system being considered must be given. This information is broken down into: 
component models, system topology diagram, and the failure rate data for the 
components.  
 
The component models used in this work are in the form of decision tables [4]. For 
each component its state is combined with all possible inputs from the components 
with which it is linked to give outputs which are passed on to other components 
within the system. The construction of such tables and their use in other automated 
procedures is described in detail by Salem et al. [4].  
 
The system topology diagram details how the components inputs and outputs are 
linked together within the system.  
 
The failure rate data includes a description of the failure modes of component as well 
as their rate of failure and is used in the construction of fault trees and their 
quantification, and hence the final CCD quantification. For some systems it is also 
necessary to specify initial states for the components.  
 
The algorithm also requires that an initiating event is identified. At the current stage 
of the algorithm development this event is given by the user. It depends upon the 
system under construction and is generally a component, with associated function, 
which initiates the system. This is the first event considered in the algorithm.  
 
In order to ensure that the CCD construction process completes and the algorithm 
does not continually consider components that are linked together, stopping criteria 
must also be identified. These indicate at which point the algorithm has reached a 
consequence and hence that path is completed.  
 
ii) Construction algorithm 
 
A set of rules are applied to construct the consequence diagram. These rules have 
been developed here but in order to present the work in a concise manner they have 
not been listed. In summary, initially the order in which the components are 
considered is determined by use of the topology diagram. If the system contains 
circuits then these are used to determine the order. A circuit is a path containing a 
power supply which starts and ends at the same component and with all components 
passing current. Starting form the initiating event the functionality of each component 
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or subsystem is investigated and, by use of the decision tables and topology diagram, 
the consequences of these sequences determined. The procedure continues until the 
stopping criteria is reached.  
 
iii) Diagram reduction 
 
If any decision boxes are deemed irrelevant (e.g. the branches attached to the NO and 
YES branches are identical) then these boxes should be removed and the next decision 
box or consequence box in the path put in its place. Each decision box should be 
inspected and if no further redundancies exist the cause-consequence diagram is 
deemed minimal [6]. 
 
iv) Development of the fault trees 
 
If a decision box is governed not by a component but by a sub-system then the 
probability of failure will be obtained via a fault tree [7]. These fault trees are 
produced automatically using fault tree construction methods developed previously 
[4, 5]. 
 
v) Analysis 
 
Having constructed the CCD it can be used to analyse the system under consideration. 
 
A qualitative analysis will produce the list of causes for each outcome condition. 
These are established by considering each decision box on a path to the particular 
outcome and listing the components failure or success as indicated by the exit path 
from the decision box. 
 
A quantitative analysis will produce the probability of each system outcome. As the 
algorithm ensures that the probabilities of the decision boxes of the CCD are 
independent these are obtained by simply multiplying the probabilities of the 
component events in the branch leading to that consequence. Each consequence for a 
system is then determined by summing the probability of each set of events which 
lead to this particular outcome, as stated by Nielsen [1]. 
 
In order to demonstrate the construction and analysis process described above it is 
applied to a simple system. 
 
Application to a simple system 
 
The cause-consequence diagram construction algorithm is now described in detail in 
relation to the simple example of a lamp system illustrated in figure 2. The system 
consists of a switch, relay, two power supplies and a lamp. The switch can be closed 
or opened manually. When the switch is closed current reaches the relay which should 
close the contacts, causing current to reach the lamp which would then light. When 
the switch is open the contacts will open and the lamp will no longer light. 
 
Initially the lamp system is considered to be in a dormant state. Therefore the switch 
and the contacts are open. 
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Figure 2. The lamp system block diagram 
 
Automated CCD construction 
 
Following the automated algorithm described the following steps are taken: 
 
i) Algorithm requirements: A topology diagram for the system is constructed, see 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. A topology diagram for a lamp system 
 
Where SW is the switch, R is the relay, PS1 and PS2 are power supplies 1 and 2, 
respectively, LP is the lamp and CN is the contacts (a component linking the relay to 
the second circuit of the system). 
 
There are five decision tables relevant to the components in the example. These are 
shown below. As an example of how to construct a decision table for a component 
consider the switch, see table 1. Two failure modes have been considered for this 
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component, failed open (FO) and failed closed (FC) as described in table 6. From the 
topology diagram, figure 3, it can be seen that SW has two inputs, IN1, – the manual 
closing or opening and IN2 the current from PS1. IN1 has two possible states, closed 
(CL) and open (OP), and IN2 has current (C) or co current (NC). Table 1 considers all 
possible combinations of inputs from IN1 and IN2 and all possible states of SW and 
the effects these will have on the output to the relay. The sign “–” in the inputs and 
state columns indicates the “don’t matter” condition, which means that the specified 
input states will result in the specified output state regardless of the value of the 
variable. For example, there are two causes of current in the output, these are: 
1. Input 1 is closed (IN1 = CL), current in input 2 (IN2 = C) and switch working 
(W). 
2. Current in input 2 (IN2 = C) and the switch failed closed (FC). 
The other tables are constructed in a similar manner. 
 
 IN1 IN2 State OUT 
1 CL C W C 
2 OP – W NC 
3 – NC – NC 
4 – – FO NC 
5 – C FC C 
 
Table 1. Decision table for Switch 
 
 
 IN State OUT 
1 C W C 
2 – F NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 2. Decision table for Power Supply 
 
 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W CL C 
2 NC W OP NC 
3 – FO OP – 
4 – FC CL – 
5 C – – C 
6 NC  – – NC 
 
Table 3. Decision table for Relay 
 
 
 IN1 IN2 OUT 
1 C CL C 
2 – OP NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 4. Decision table for Contacts 
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 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W L C 
2 – F NL – 
3 NC – NL NC 
 
Table 5. Decision table for Lamp 
 
Where L is light and NL is no light, and F is failed. 
 
The input data for the components in the system is shown in table 6. In this example 
failure rates, necessary for quantification, have not been included as the example has 
been taken in order to demonstrate the construction process.  
 
Component Failure mode Description 
SW_FO Switch failed open, operator cannot close it 
 
 
SW 
(Switch) SW_FC Switch failed closed, it cannot be opened 
 
PS# 
(Power supply) 
PS#_F Failed, no power to a circuit. 
# takes values 1 or 2 
R_FC Relay contacts fails closed 
 
 
R 
(Relay) R_FO Relay contacts fails open 
LP 
(Lamp) 
LP_F Failed, no light 
 
Table 6. Failure data for the components 
 
The initial conditions, are that the switch and the relay contacts are open, i.e. 
SW: OUT = NC; 
R: OUT1 = OP. 
 
In order to start the algorithm the initiating component and its function must be 
identified. The system considered is initiated when the switch closes. Hence the 
initiating component is SW with function CL. In the notation adopted here this is 
written as: 
SW: IN1 => CL, 
which states that input 1 of switch closes.  
 
The stopping criteria in this case are the two possible consequences, lamp lights or 
lamp doesn’t light, i.e. the diagram path terminates in one of these consequences:  
LP: (OUT1 => L ∪  OUT1 => NL). 
 
ii) Construction algorithm: The algorithm now has all the information it requires to 
generate the CCD. Initially it decides the order in which the components are to be 
considered. Starting from the initiating event components are traced through the 
topology diagram and any circuits identified. If the output of a component within a 
circuit is also connected to another component which is contained within a different 
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circuit, then, these two circuits must be considered in turn when constructing the 
cause-consequence diagram. 
 
In the example it can be seen that there are two circuits: {PS1, SW, R, PS1} and 
{PS2, CN, LP, PS2}, see figure 4. As the circuits contain different components they 
are treated individually.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Circuits of lamp system 
 
Starting from the initiating component, switch, the CCD is constructed. Since the 
initiating event is switch closed, the Switch decision table, table 1, with entry CL in 
column IN1 is considered. Row 1 satisfies the criteria and has output C. Hence, as 
component SW is traced within circuit 1 the first decision box is created with the 
question related to the output OUT, see figure 5: “Is C in Circuit1?” i.e. does the 
switch close and power supply 1 work? The comments in brackets in the decision box 
in the figure are added for clarity.  
 
From the rules developed the YES branches of the decision boxes are traced first until 
the consequence box is reached. Hence the YES branch of decision box 1 is traced 
(Figure 5). The topology diagram is checked to determine if any components within 
circuit 1 have outputs that are external and therefore connect to components within 
other circuits. Only one external output is found – OUT1 from component R, and 
hence this is considered next.  
 
Following the YES branch of box 1 there is current C in OUT of SW and hence, as 
OUT of SW is connected to IN of R, see figure 3, the input, IN, of relay R is current 
C. Hence all rows in the Relay decision table 3 with C in IN are considered. “Don’t 
matter” states are also included since in this case the state of the input could be C. 
There are 4 such rows (1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th). However in the 4th row the relay is in a 
failed closed state, which contradicts the initial assumption that the relay is open, thus 
only 3 rows describe the given situation. The external output of R, OUT1, column 3 in 
table 3, must now be considered. This determines the next decision box, box 2   
(Figure 5). Considering the rows in turn row 1 is considered first and in this case 
OUT1 of relay R is closed CL, hence the decision box contains the question              
“Is R: OUT1 = CL?” 
Circuit2 
Circuit1 
SW R 
 CN  LP 
 PS1 
PS2 
OUT = C or NC OUT = C or NC OUT2 = C or NC 
 PS1 
OUT = C or NC OUT = C or NC OUT2 = C or NC 
 PS2 
OUT1 = CL or OP 
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The algorithm proceeds by tracing the component connected to the external output of 
relay. From the topology diagram, figure 3, it can be seen that output OUT1 of R 
connects to input IN2 of contacts CN. Therefore component CN is now considered. 
Following the YES branch of decision box 2 IN2 of CN is CL and hence the rows of 
the decision table for contacts, table 4, with IN2 = CL are considered. There are 2 
such rows, 1 and 3 and considering row 1 first results in C in OUT. As this component 
is contained within the second circuit a new decision box 3 is introduced (Figure 5), 
which asks the question “Is C in Circuit2?” 
 
Following the YES branch results in current in circuit 2. Components with external 
output within circuit 2 are then identified. There is one such component, lamp. Two 
rows in the lamp decision table (table 5) satisfy the condition that there is current in 
circuit 2, these are rows 1 and 2. Considering row 1 decision box 4 is created which 
questions the value of the external output of lamp, OUT1, which in this row is L, i.e.: 
“Is LP: OUT1 => L?” 
 
Following the YES branch of decision box 4 results in light being output from the 
lamp. Therefore the stopping criteria for this branch is reached and a consequence box 
has to be created. Hence the consequence box “LP: OUT1 = L” is added, see  figure 5, 
where the complete branch is shown. 
 
When all YES outputs of the branch are traced, the algorithm proceeds by returning to 
the NO outputs of the last decision box, which in this case is box 4. Following the NO 
branch of decision box 4, all possible values of OUT1 in table 5 except for L must be 
considered. There is only one other value, NL. From table 5,   row 2 is the only row 
satisfying the conditions, as from decision box 3 there is C in circuit 2. Hence the 
stopping criteria for the second branch is reached LP: OUT1 = NL and a consequence 
box is created (Figure 5).  
 
From the algorithm the NO branch of decision box 3 is now considered which results 
in no current in circuit 2. Considering the component in circuit 2 with external output, 
LP, results in the external output, OUT1, being NL. As from the decision table for 
lamp, table 5, rows 2 and 3 satisfy NC in IN and both result in NL in OUT1. Hence the 
consequence box “LP: OUT1 = NL” is added.  
 
A similar situation arises following the NO branch of decision box 2. If the relay 
doesn’t close the contacts, from table 4, it is apparent that no current circulates in 
circuit 2 and therefore the lamp wouldn’t light.  
 
Moving up to the NO branch of decision box 1 no current is detected in     circuit 1. 
The algorithm detects that either the switch doesn’t close or the power supply is 
failed, rows 3 and 4 in table 1, and rows 2 and 3 in table 2, respectively. This results 
in NC in IN of relay and hence from table 3 the contacts remain open leading to NL 
from OUT1 of lamp. 
 
Having returned to decision box 1 with all branches terminating in a consequence box 
the CCD is complete. 
 
iii) Diagram reduction: The cause-consequence diagram presented in figure 5 cannot 
be reduced as no redundant decision boxes are identified.  
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iv) Development of the fault trees: Fault trees are now developed for each decision 
box starting with the first one. The fault trees: Ft1, Ft2, Ft3 and Ft4, are constructed 
according to the decision table method and are shown in figure 6. 
 
v) Analysis: The final cause-consequence diagram for a simple lamp system, figure 2, 
is presented in figure 5 with the corresponding fault trees in figure 6 which are shown 
in reduced form. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cause-consequence diagram for a lamp system 
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Figure 6. Fault trees for the CCD shown in figure 5 
 
Having obtained the diagram it can now be analysed and quantified in a 
straightforward manner. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
 
For the example considered the failure event is no light from the lamp, i.e. the 
consequence “LP: OUT1 = NL”. In the diagram there are 4 consequence boxes with 
this outcome. To obtain the minimal cut sets the failure events leading to these boxes 
must be traced. For example for the consequence box on the NO branch of decision 
box 1 the component failures leading to this are given from Ft1, i.e. PS1_F or 
SW_FO. Considering the other consequence boxes in the same manner leads to the 
complete list of minimal cut sets:  
{PS1_F}, {SW_FO}, {R_FO}, {PS2_F}, {LP_F}. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
Considering the paths of the CCD leading to NL the probability of the system failing 
and producing no light can be obtained. The four paths leading to the consequence 
“LP: OUT1 = NL” are:  
1) no current in circuit 1; 
2) current in circuit 1, but the relay doesn’t close the contacts; 
3) current in circuit 1 and the relay closes the contacts, but power supply 2 
doesn’t work; 
4) current in circuit 1, the relay closes the contacts, there is current in circuit 2, 
but there is no light from the lamp.  
The probability of NL is obtained by adding the probability of each path. Then 
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where  
FOSWq _  is the probability of switch (SW) failure to close (fails open), 
1PSq  is the probability of power supply 1 (PS1) failure, 
FORq _  is the probability of relay (R) failure to close the contacts (fails open), 
2PSq  is the probability of power supply 2 (PS2) failure and 
LPq  is the probability of lamp (LP) failure. 
 
This is the same results as would be obtained by taking the four minimal cut sets 
listed earlier and using the inclusion-exclusion expansion [8]. 
 
Conclusions 
 
An algorithm to automatically construct cause-consequence diagrams is developed in 
this paper. From an initial description of a system the algorithm develops the CCD in 
a logical manner. Such an automatic construction saves an analyst from a laborious 
and time consuming task and ensures that all possible system behaviour is modelled. 
The diagram generated can be quantified simply to give exact probabilities of all 
system outcomes considered. The algorithm employs topology diagrams and decision 
tables, methods developed previously for fault tree construction. 
 
In order to demonstrate the algorithm a very simple example has been considered 
here, however the algorithm has been tested with several substantial industrial 
examples. 
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